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LEGISLATIVE POWER TO AMEND CHARTERS.
SINCE the DartmouthCollege Case, it has been admitted on all
hands, that the charters of incorporated companies are contracts,
which the legislature cannot alter or amend without express power
so to do, reserved. In consequence of the decision in that case,
a general law was spread .upon the statute book of nearly all, if
not quite all, the states of the Union, reserving to the legislature
power to alter or modify all such charters as should be thereafter
granted, according to its will and pleasure. The limits of this
power, if it has any limits, and the effect which any amendment
engrafted by the legislature is to have upon the operations of an
incorporated company, form one of the most interesting and important of the unsettled questions of the day. Its presence is perhaps
more frequently felt in discussions growing out of the attempt to
consolidate separate and distinct lines of railway into one, than
in any other cases; and the vital importance- of the subject could
not find an apter occasion for its illustration. Every day we are
brought acquainted with instances where the prospect of greatly
increased profits, or the plea of public necessity, serves a majority of corporators for an excuse in procuring the legislature
to crowd an unwilling minority into enterprises which they never
agreed to go into and are unwilling to enter upon. He who founds
his . faith upon the eternal principles of right, rather than upon
the temporary and shifting prospect af present advantage, may
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well pause and strive to mark out the boundaries of even legislative will upon this subject.
In the case of Zabriskie v. ifackensack J,' N. Y. B. B. (Jo., 6
Am. Law Reg. N. S. 420; s. c., 3 0. E. Green 178, a company
was chartered to build a road from Iackensack to the Paterson
and Hudson River Railroad, a distance of five miles, which was
accordingly built and operated for a number of years. Subsequently, the legislature authorized the company to extend their
road to Nanuet on the Erie Railroad, a distance of about twelve
miles, and the company, under this liberty, made preparations to
construct about two and a half miles of this extension. The
Chancellor enjoined them at the suit of a stockholder, from using
the funds of the company to construct this extension. There was
at the time the company was incorporated, a general statute in the
New Jersey laws, authorizing the legislature to alter, modify, or
repeal charters to be granted in the future.
The theory of the case is this: that a simple legislative permission to the company to enlarge their enterprise, is in no sense
mandatory in its character; that the original agreement between
the corporators was to build a road of five miles length, and they
could not have extended it further without legislative authority :
when this legislative authority was given, it required another
agreement, in which all should unite, in order that the new enterprise might be sanctioned, and unless this unanimous assent was
obtained, the original purpose must be taken as the measure of
the company's powers.
In the case of Durfee v. Old 0olony and Fall River Railroad,
5 Allen 230, an incorporated company had constructed a road
from Fall River to Boston. Subsequently, the legislature authorized it to extend the road to the Rhode Island line, there to connect with another line which was so located as to appear to be a
consistent and component part of the original enterprise of this
company, upon the extension being approved of by two-thirds of
the stockholders. The court, at the suit of a stockholder who
had voted against the extension, refused to enjoin the company
in the undertaking.
We understand the argument of the case to be about this:That where stockholders enter into an agreement to construct
a road from A. to B., with notice that the legislature reserves to
itself power to alter or amend their charter, they thereby agree,
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that in case the legislature subsequently authorizes an extension
of the road from B. to 0. that they will also go into the enterprise
of constructing the road from B. to 0., p)rovided, that the extension is simply ancillary to the design which was had in building
the road from A. to B., or, in other- words, so that the extension
is but an enlargement or expansion of the original design, and
provided also, that the extension be voted for by a majority of
the stockholders.
That where stockholde.rs go into an incorporation, it becomes
'a fundamental contract, that the majority shall manage the affairs
of the corporation, and use its means and resources in any manner that they miay think best to carry out the design which was
had in forming the incorporation, provided they do not use them
in. the prosecution of an enterprise which is outside of the general
purpose had in view at the beginning.
That the future prospect thereby guaranteed to them of extending the road from B. to C. when they should be in a condition
to do it, may have been one of the most influential and controlling
considerations to the majority in inducing them to go into the
enterprise of constructing the road from A. to B. : that therefore,
when they are in a condition to make the extension, the minority
-have no right to stop short and say that the majority may go, but
they, the minority, will not, but the minority must go also into
the new enterprise, as the faith that they would do it, provided
it should be within the scope of the original purpose, and voted
for by the majority, was what led the niajority to go into the first
plan with them. See also Hanna v. The Cincinnati and Fort
Wayne R B. Co., 20 Ind. 80; Curry v. Scott, 54 Penn. 270;
Bailey v. Hollister, 26 N. Y. 112; Pacific B. B. Co. v. Hayes,
22 Missouri 291; Northern B. B. Co. v. Hiller, 10 Barb. 260;
Schenectady and SaratogaPlank Boad Co. v. Thatcher, 1 Kern.
102; fcLaren v. Pennington, 1 Paige R. 102; State, Jersey
Oty and Bergen Bt. B. Co. v. 1ayor, 81 N. J. L. R. 579 ; Anderson v. Commonwealth, .18 Gratt. 285.
It is impossible to reconcile the reasoning of the case of Durfee v. Old Colony B. B. Co. with that of Zabriskie v. The Hackensack B. B. Co. The one proceed3 upon the theory, that whei.
the legislature authorizes the extension of a road, even though
but an expansion of the original undertaking, every stockholder
must assent to the extension before it can be undertaken; while
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the other assumes, that when the first enterprise is undertaken,
with notice that the legislature reserves to itself power to alter
the charter, every stockholder agrees that he will go into the
new enterprise, when the legislature shall tack it on, provided it
be but an expansion of the original design, and providea it be
voted for by a majority of the stockholders.
This case may fairly be regarded as an authority for the last
proposition. So that, under it, the single question before the
court when such a case arises, is, whether the majority have
iwrongly judged, in concluding that a particular extension is no
more than a bare expansion of the original design.
It would seem, in the case before the court, to have been a
considerable tax upon the powers of inference, to assume that an
agreement to construct a road from Fall River to Boston, contemplated a future extension of the road to the Rhode Island line.
As to this, see 1 Redfield on Railways 614 note, ed. 1869.
Before leaving this case, it is as well to call attention to what
is said by the court in the conclusion of the opinion, as to what
it was intended to decide by the case. In order, it would seem,
to prevent any misapprehension in regard to what the case decided, the court say, "all that we mean to determine is, that the
obligation of the contract which subsists between the corporation
and a stockholder, by virtue of his being a,proprietor of shares
in the corporate stock, is not impaired by an act of the legislature
which amends and alters the charter, and authorizes the corporation to undertake new and additional enterprises of a nature
similar to those embraced within the original grant of power, if
such act is accepted by a majority of the stockholders in the mode.
provided by law."
Reading this passage in the light of the case at large, we take
it to mean, that the corporators contract to go into all "new and
additional enterprises of a nature similar to those embraced within
the original" purposes of the incorporation. We feel constrained
to believe that this language was inadvertently used. The court
had the case before it in its mind, and intended to use language
applicable to it. It had concluded that the extension of the road
from Fall River to the Rhode Island line, was but an amplification
of the original plan of building a road from Fall River to Boston; therefore, we feel constrained to .believe that it intended to
say, that when the new enterprise is one, [not of a nature similar
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to that embraced within the original purpose, but,] which is simply
an expansion of the original enterprise, to longer' proportions, in
that case, the stockholders must be held to have contracted to go
into it, if the majority require it. For, if this reading be refused,
what interpretation are we to give to the expression, "-of a nature
similar to those embraced within the original" purposes? Are we
to conclude that the court intended to say, that a corporator going
into the enterprise of building a road from Fall River to Boston,
contracts to go into every enterprise of a. nature similar to that
one? What would be an enterprise of a nature similar to that
one ? Building another road from Fall River to Boston, or
building a road from one village of local traffic, on the coast of
Massachusetts, to another village of like traffic upon the same
coast ?
To interpret the judge's language literally, would be to hold
that an engagement to build one railroad, is an engagement to
build any other railroad, for, building any railroad, is of a nature
similar to building any other railroad; a proposition for which
we suppose no one would contend.
But, though we confine the case to what it really did decide,
viz., that stockholders who go into an enterprise with notice that
the legislature reserves to itself power to alter or amend their
charter, thereby contract that they will go into such future enterprises as the legislature may authorize, provided they be within
the scope of the original design, and approved of by the majority,
can it then be supported upon principle ?
It seems difficult to put the limit upon the corporator's contract
as to the future, which the court puts, if the principle that it may
be enlarged, is admitted at all. No reason is apparent why, if it
be once admitted that the majority is to be at liberty to go one
step beyond the very purpose which the corporators set about
accomplishing, they may not go a dozen steps beyond. It seems
difficult to say, that the corporator does contract that the majority
may carry him into such new enterprises as are an expansion
simply, of the first, but that he does not contract that they may
carry him into all such enterprises as they may choose if the
legislature authorizes them.
When a corporator contracts to build a road from A. to B., if
nothing is said at the time about extending it to 0., we can see no
more reason for assuming that he impliedly gives the majority
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authority to carry it to C. than for assuming that he gives them
authority to carry it to any other place. It is true he contracts
that the majority shall direct the operations and shape the policy
of the incorporation, within the particularcharter given to them,
but only within the limits of that. To continue the use of the
illustration just used, the corporator may have property in A. and
B. but none in C., and the controlling motive with him may have
been to improve those two places. He may have been violently
antagonistic to the interests of C., and if it had been mooted at the
time the contract was made, whether the road should be continued
to C., even though an apparent amplification simply of the first
design he might have said that he would not go into the enterprise
at all. Indeed, we can conceive of no new enterprise which will
be simply an expansion of the old. A road from A. to B. is one
thing, an extension of it to C. is quite another: and when the
simple expansion is undertaken, the old'purpose and design is
wholly abandoned. Therefore, if the principle is admitted, that
the corporator contracts that the majority may take him into some
new enterprises, it is difficult to perceive where the majority is to
find its limit, and how the corporator can refuse to go into every
future and new. enterprise. There is no more reason for saying
that he is willing to extend the road from B. to C. than there is
that he is willing to extend it to the Rocky Mountains. There is
no more authority for saying that he is willing to enlarge the
particular enterprise, than there is for saying that he is willing to
go into all enterprises.
In a case to be cited directly, it is urged that it would be
exceedingly hard for the holder of one single share in an incorporated company, to have it in his power to restrain the owners
of millions of dollars worth, from putting their capital into some
new enterprises that promised them great returns. In answer it
may be said that it would be equally hard for the owners of millions
of dollars worth to force the single shareholder into an enterprise
that he did not wish to go into, and had never contracted to go
into. But with reference to either, if he had contracted in such
manner as to give the other that power, all that could be said
would be, "hoe perquam durum est, secd ita lex scripta est."
But the hardship suggested, isone that is imaginary rather
than real. There is a lawful way by which the majority stockholder can go into the icw enterprise, consistently with his
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contract with the minority stockholder, and without carrying him,
nolens voleis, into the new scheme. It is incident to every corporation not incorporated for a specified time, that it shall be
subject to dissolution by a vote 'of the majority of the stockholders. Therefore if the majority are unwilling to icontinue the
old enterprise without adding the new, let them dissolve the corporation, sell the property, pay off the debts, and turn over the
surplus to the stockholders. They may then take their proportion
and engage in any new scheme that they like. Would not this be
done in every case of a partnership, where the partners could
not agree? And what more is a corporation, quoad hoc, than
a partnership ?
The case of Lauman. v. The Lebanon Valley B. B. Co., 80
Penna. 42, recognises this principle, but, as we shall endeavor to
showyv falls most egregiously short in its application of it. In
that case, the legislature authorized two railroads to consolidate
into one, and provided that the stockholders should by a majority
vote, agree upon the terms upon which the consolidation should
be effected. By a majority vote of the corporation, to be merged,
the stockholders agreed to merge their corporation into the other,
and voted that one share of the stock of the merging company
should be taken by each shareholder of the merged company in
place of this share in his own company. A stockholder'who voted
against this arrangement, applied to the court to have it annulled.
The court held that no consolidation could be effected without the
assistance of an act of the legislature'; that the vote for a consolidation under the Act of Assembly, was equivalent to a vote
for a dissolution, and an acceptance by the legislature of the
surrender, and that all the stockholder, who was plaintiff, could
claim, was his equitable share of the value of the corporate property. Therefore upon the corporation executing a bond to pay
the plaintiff the market value of his shares when that should be
ascertained, the court dismissed the cause.
We would remark in passing, that we can perceive no principle upon which this vote for a consolidation could be held equivalent to a vote for a dissolutio.n. Non constat, liecause a majority
of the stockholders were willing to consolidate with another road,
that they would therefore have been willing to dissolve their corporation, if the question before them had been dissolution or not.
But this objection aside: if the court proposed that the plaintiff's
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right to object to the consolidation was to be taken from him upon
his being paid the market value of his stock, to be determined
by some species of appraisement, [how the value was to be ascertained does not appear from the report, but we are bound to presume that it was to be done by appraisement]-then the court
'was guilty of a most palpable violation of the plaintiff's rights.
One of the incidents to the dissolution of a corporation is, that
the property shall be sold to the highest bidder at public auction,
and the proceeds, after paying off the debts, divided amongst the
shareholders. This is one of the most valuable rights incident
to the contract between the co-corporators. When they go into
an enterprise, they contract with each other, that each shall have
his proportionate share of the largest sum of money which the
enterprise can be made to produce, whatever shape events may
take. Now the market value per share of stock, in many instances falls far short of affording any index to what that shareholder's real interest in the property of the corporation really is, if
it should be sold at public auction, which his contract gives him
a right to have done. For instance, there may be a railroad, in
which the stock is worth in the market per share, no more than
twenty-five dollars, yet, because of its location, and the possibility
of developing it into a great affair, there may be two rival corporations- of immense means, both of which are anxious to have
it. Now, if the shareholder's interest is appraised, he will receive
twenty-five dollars only; whereas if the road were put up at
public auction, where these two strong corporate bodies could
have an opportunity of bidding for it, it might bring the shareholder far more than twenty-five dollars. A most remarkable
instance of this very sort occurred in this state (Virginia) within
the past year. The state's interest in the road connecting Richmond with Petersburg was to be sold. It was sufficiently large
to give the purchaser the management of the road. Two rival
corporations of large means wanted it. Now, while the stock
was only worth thirty dollars per share in the market, yet after
this strife commenced, one of the corporations actually made a
bondfide and binding offer of two hundred dollars per share for
it. It may be said in answer to this argument, that, under a
series of decided cases, the road-bed and franchises cannot be
sold except by permission of the legislature. Without stopping
to discuss this proposition, we reply that we propose to confine
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these remarks to cases where the road is under mortgage by.permission of the legislature (the case, we apprehend, with most
roads), in which case, by selling under the mortgage, the legislative permission to sell is carried.
It will be borne in mind that these remarks have been addressed
entirely to a case in which the legislature authorizes a new enterprise; not to one where it commands it. Perhaps such a case
should be entitled to a separate discussion, though it would seem to
be disposed of by a single consideration. These reservations of
power are clearly made for the purpose of protection.
They are to avoid the danger of corporations becoming unmanageable from their growth. They are not for the purpose of forcing
a company into new enterprises, but of prohibiting the future
prosecution of the old, except upon conditions which the public
safety is found to require. Whereas, before the liberty to amend
was-reserved,' the company was entitled to prosecute their enterprise through all time on the terms and conditions originally
accorded to them, yei, now the legislature has acquired power to
say, the enterprise shall not be prosecuted, except it be prosecuted
upon new terms and conditions. Thus the legislature may say,
that a railroad company shall not operate its road from A. to B.
unless it also builds a road to C.; but it has no power to f6rce
the company to build the road to C. Whether the company will
build the road to 0. is a matter for the company itself to determine,
and it cannot be done unless every stockholder agrees to it. The
legislature has power to put them into the condition of choosing
between the alternatives of giving up their enterprise, 'or of continuing it by extending the road. When it requires the new
enterprise to be added, then any stockholder *maysay, I never
bargained to go into this additional scheme, and I am unwilling
to go into it. I prefer to adopt -the alternative of abandoning the
old one. Then let us dissolve, sell out and divide.
* Our propositions then are:I. That the power to alter or amend charters, gives the legislature no authority to force a company into any new enterprise,
or into any enlargement of the old; but only to prescribe new
conditions upon which the old shall be conducted.
II. That when the legislature authorizes a new enterprise, or
an enlargement of the old, it can only be undertaken upon every
stockholder agreeing to it.
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ILI. That there is no more authority for assuming that a stockholder who contracts to build a road from A. to B. with notice
that the legislature reserves power to amend his charter, impliedly contracts that he will extend it to C. when the legislature
authorizes such extension, than there is for assuming that he
thereby contracts to extend it to any other place, or to build any
other road.
IV. That when the legislature authorizes a new enterprise, or
an enlargement of the old, if a majority wish to undertake it, the
only way in which it can be done, in spite of an unwilling minority,
is for the majority to dissolve the corporation, sell the property at
public auction, and divide out the proceeds.
A class of cases already cited in a foregoing part of this paper
is apparently inconsistent with this argument. They are cases
where a shareholder has subscribed to stock in a company, has
paid only a portion of the subscription price, and has given his
note for the balance; subsequently the legislature authorizes a new
enterprise, which the majority resolve to go into; whereupon the
subscriber refuses to pay up-what is due upon his subscription
upon the ground that the enterprise now is a different one from
that which he agreed to go into. In a number of such cases, the
courts have compelled the unwilling subscriber to pay up the full
amount of the subscription. These cases are in no degree in
conflict with the theory which this paper has sought to disclose.
There is not in one of them, an intimation even, that the subscriber
is ,underany obligation to go into the new enterTrse; all that they
decide is that he must pay up what he agreed to pay when he
subscribed to the stock. When he gave his note for the subscription price, he was "as much a stockholder as though he had paid
money. The corporation agreed to take his note in lieu of money,
and that note became then as much corporation assets as the
money would have been. He is a stockholder, entitled to all the
rights of a stockholder; the corporation is his creditor entitled to
enforce payment of the debt, irrespective of any future operations
of the company. He may say, here is the money due upon my
stock, now give me my share of the corporation property. Here
is the debt which I owe you in respect to the enterprise which we
agreed to go into, now give me my share of the corpus, as you
wish to carry yours into another enterprise which I do not wish to
go into.

